intensifies efforts to erase reunification prospects, reclassifying South Korea from ‘kin’ to ‘enemy,’ and labeling it ‘puppet.’ It may call a Supreme People’s Assembly meeting to consider constitutional changes and potentially cancel the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, a step towards officially endorsing the Peninsula’s permanent split and distancing South Korea from shared national and reunification goals.
On the 28th, the Ministry of Unification unveiled potential plans by North Korea to convene the Supreme People’s Assembly, possibly amending the constitution and nullifying the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. An official from the Ministry expressed the likelihood of another meeting under the current regime to discuss these changes, hinting at organizational and inter-Korean agreement matters. The North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly, having either reached or nearing the end of its five-year term under the 14th Assembly, is yet to announce any election schedules. Concerning constitutional amendments, there’s speculation on removing clauses regarding reunification, specifying hostile relations, and potentially adding territorial clauses reflecting a two-country logic.
Following Kim Jong-un’s references to a “two-state” scenario, there’s speculation about a possible reorganization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to incorporate South Korea-related functions, as well as potential personnel changes. Moreover, the upcoming Supreme People’s Assembly might discuss nullifying the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, including its political and military aspects, especially after the economic sector agreement was terminated in a previous session.
The Ministry of Unification suggests that the Supreme People’s Assembly might align its activities with South Korea’s key political dates, such as the legislative election on April 10th or the commencement of the 22nd National Assembly, to strategically communicate with the South.
After Kim Jong-un’s directive in January to eliminate the concepts of “same ethnicity” and “reunification,” North Korea has accelerated various measures, including dismantling the Monument to the Three-Point Charter for National Reunification, renaming ‘Tongil Station’, and revising the national anthem’s lyrics. Other actions include changing the names of ‘Tongil Street’ and ‘Tongil Market’ to ‘Rangrang Street’ and ‘Rangrang Market’, removing the Unification Pavilion signage in Panmunjom, and taking down unification monuments across the country.
Kim Jong-un’s dramatic change in North Korea’s policy towards South Korea and reunification, breaking from 80 years of precedent, has profound implications. Under Kim Il-sung, a shift from military unification to a theory of a “North Korean-style federation” based on diverse systems and ideologies emerged. Kim Jong-il further evolved this strategy, using the theme of “same ethnicity” to leverage North-South relations as a funding conduit for nuclear and missile development.
The evolution of North Korea’s unification approach, from military conquest to concepts of federalism, has been influenced by three main factors: the internal dynamics of the ‘Suryong power’ system established in 1987, the advancements in South Korea’s democracy and economy, and global shifts post-Cold War.
In December 2016, Choi Kyong-hui, director of the SAND Institute, shared insights in the Korean Political Review through a study titled “A Study on North Korea’s ‘Two-State’ System for Unification Strategy: Focusing on North Korea’s ‘Suryong (supreme leader) Regime and Permanent Division Strategy.” She discussed how, since 1987, North Korea, under its ‘Suryong’ system, reshaped its national and ethnic identities. This redefinition aimed to shift the unification perspective from an aggressive “one Korea” approach to a defensive stance recognizing “two Koreas,” centered around the legacy of Suryong Kim Il-sung.
Choi Kyong-hui explained that to maintain the ‘Suryong’ system, North Korea redefined concepts like ‘Kim Il-sung people’, ‘Kim Jong-il governance’, and ‘Pyongyang Time’. This reconstruction resulted in estranging the shared memories and identities of the Korean people across the North and South. According to her, North Korea’s strategy essentially is one of maintaining a “two-system” status quo on the Peninsula, superficially cloaked in the notion of national unity, yet fundamentally aimed at a permanent division.
Kim Jong-un took steps to further solidify this division by stripping away any pretense of shared ethnicity or aspirations for unification with South Korea, designating it as an adversary. In response to international sanctions triggered by its nuclear advancements, Kim employed a “nuclear leverage” strategy with peace offensive in 2018. This strategy sought to utilize the Moon Jae-in administration’s preference for inter-Korean dialogue over international pressure as a means to engage both the U.S. and China, effectively positioning North Korea on the global stage through a series of summits with South Korea, the U.S., and China.
After the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, Kim Jong-un seemed to abandon any remaining aspirations for reunification with South Korea, openly discarding the concept. Significantly, during the Workers’ Party Central Committee meetings from December 28th to 31st, 2019, ‘the reunification of the Korean peninsula’ was conspicuously absent from Kim’s New Year’s Address for the first time.
The absence of a Workers’ Party congress since the 6th in 1980 was primarily due to stalled reunification progress, economic issues, and external pressures. Kim Jong-un’s decision to abandon reunification ambitions enabled the timely scheduling of the 8th congress, five years after the 7th congress in 2016.
In January 2021, at the 8th Congress, Kim Jong-un stated that reunification now seems much less achievable, indicating North Korea’s shift away from reunification goals towards solidifying the Kim dynasty’s control over its territory with a two-state strategy. The possible cancellation of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, defining North and South Korea as entities seeking reunification, raises concerns about further dividing the Korean Peninsula and increasing estrangement among Koreans. @SAND
(Cho Yui-haeng, Seoul Theological University North Korea)
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