Recently, North Korea has simultaneously exhibited two sharply contrasting tendencies. On the one hand, it is institutionalizing the severance of inter-Korean relations through its declaration of “two hostile states”; on the other hand, it appears to be modulating tensions by offering an unusually positive response to South Korea’s expression of regret over the drone incursion incident.
These contradictory dynamics should not be interpreted as mere shifts in posture or temporary reactions. Rather, they suggest that North Korea is pursuing a dual-track strategy: structurally entrenching hostility while seeking to manage and contain the escalation of localized tensions.
Under these conditions, how should peace on the Korean Peninsula be conceptualized? This paper examines the “logic of management” that persists even amid institutionalized hostility, taking North Korea’s recent responses as its analytical point of departure. On this basis, it argues for redefining peace on the Korean Peninsula not as the improvement of inter-Korean relations, but as the institutionalization of coexistence.
The Structuring of Hostility: A Shift in Inter-Korean Relations
North Korea’s policy of hostility toward the South is no longer merely rhetorical. Pyongyang is recalibrating its strategy to redefine the fundamental nature of inter-Korean relations. This shift is clearly reflected in its recent characterization of inter-Korean relations as a “relationship between two hostile states,” accompanied by the effective abandonment of longstanding discourses such as unification, reconciliation, and cooperation. This development represents more than a rhetorical adjustment. Rather, North Korea is recasting inter-Korean relations from a “special relationship” into an “external security variable” requiring continuous management.
This transformation is further evidenced by recent major political developments. Following the formal designation of South Korea as one of the “two hostile states” at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in late 2023, the 2024 State of the Nation Address at the Supreme People’s Assembly explicitly identified South Korea as the “primary hostile state” and announced the removal of unification-related concepts.
At the recent First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly, inter-Korean policy was no longer articulated as an independent policy domain but was instead subsumed within the broader framework of national security and foreign policy.
Institutional changes further reinforce this shift. The reorganization and downsizing of inter-Korean agencies, along with the contraction of related policy areas, indicate that inter-Korean relations are no longer treated as a distinct policy agenda. Rather than serving as a flexible strategic instrument, these issues are increasingly functioning as a structural condition underpinning regime operations, while the relationship itself is evolving into a fixed strategic environment.
Taken together, these developments signal a fundamental transformation in the nature of inter-Korean relations. As a result, the traditional approach centered on “improving relations” is becoming increasingly disconnected from current realities. The central question is no longer how to restore relations, but rather how to manage tensions in a stable and sustainable manner under these altered conditions.
Limited Signals: North Korea’s Calculated Flexibility
Even within this broader structural transformation, North Korea’s response to the recent drone incident carries implications that extend beyond the immediate episode. On April 6, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung formally expressed regret over the drone incursion into North Korea during a Cabinet meeting and emergency economic review session at the presidential office. He stated, “Although this was not an act by our government, I express regret to the North Korean side over the unnecessary military tension caused by such reckless behavior,” and directed the establishment of preventive measures.
Within hours, Kim Yo-jong, director of a department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued an unusually conciliatory response. She remarked that it was “a very fortunate and wise behavior” for the president personally to express regret and refer to preventive measures, and further noted that Kim Jong-un
had characterized the response as reflecting a “frank and broad-minded” attitude.
In general, North Korea has maintained a consistently hardline posture in response to perceived infringements on its sovereignty or military provocations. Moreover, since designating South Korea as its “primary hostile state,” it has further reinforced this posture. Against this backdrop, its prompt and relatively positive response to South Korea’s statement constitutes a notable departure from recent patterns.
However, it would be premature to interpret this response as a signal of improving relations. Kim Yo-jong simultaneously foreclosed prospects for engagement by stating that the South should “abandon any attempts at contact,” while demanding a cessation of further provocations. This response should therefore be understood not as a simple conciliatory gesture, but as a calibrated strategy that combines acceptance of de-escalatory signals with the imposition of conditions on future interaction.
This behavior suggests that North Korea is pursuing a strategy of selectively managing both the level and direction of tension, rather than allowing tensions to escalate indiscriminately. While hostility remains the underlying strategic premise, there appears to be a clear recognition that uncontrolled escalation into military conflict is neither desirable nor strategically advantageous.
Notably, this case demonstrates that North Korea retains the capacity to selectively absorb and utilize external signals in ways that serve its interests, rather than categorically rejecting them. This reflects an approach focused on maintaining tensions within manageable limits, rather than pursuing escalation as an end in itself.
This pattern can also be understood in the context of broader foreign policy considerations. Even as it structurally distances itself from inter-Korean engagement, North Korea appears to be seeking to avoid unnecessary escalation by factoring in its relations with the United States, the sanctions environment, and domestic economic conditions.
Ultimately, North Korea’s response reflects less an intention to improve relations than a strategic decision to treat tensions as a controllable variable. In other words, it is maintaining a posture of hostility while calibrating its intensity and trajectory. This provides an important indication that, although inter-Korean relations are structurally constrained, a limited and managed space for interaction persists.
Rethinking Peace: From Engagement to Coexistence
This evolving context highlights the limitations of traditional approaches that conceptualize peace on the Korean Peninsula primarily in terms of tension reduction or the improvement of relations. Historically, peace has been understood as a process of building trust through dialogue and cooperation, ultimately aimed at restoring national homogeneity and normalizing relations. Under current conditions of institutionalized hostility, however, this framework is becoming increasingly difficult to operationalize.
As discussed, North Korea is maintaining a structurally fixed posture of hostility while simultaneously demonstrating an interest in managing the escalation of tensions. This suggests that peace is increasingly defined not as an outcome of improved relations, but rather as a set of conditions designed to prevent conflict and maintain stability within a context of persistent hostility.
This shift necessitates a reconceptualization of peace from the perspective of “coexistence,” moving beyond the traditional engagement-based paradigm. In this context, coexistence does not presuppose the restoration of trust or the normalization of relations. Rather, it assumes the persistence of mutual hostility and focuses on minimizing conflict and maintaining stability within that framework.
Accordingly, the meaning of peace is shifting from “restoring national homogeneity” to “managing stable division and preventing conflict.” This implies that peace should be understood not as the result of changing relations, but rather as a mechanism for managing risks within relatively fixed relations. In this sense, peace is no longer a static condition, but an object of active management that requires deliberate institutional design. The central challenge, therefore, lies in how to stabilize this management framework through institutional means.
The Era of Adversarial Coexistence and the Tasks for Peace
The Korean Peninsula is entering a new phase of “adversarial coexistence,” within which the management and design of peace have emerged as central policy challenges. Recent developments should not be interpreted solely as a period of heightened tension or a temporary crisis. Rather, they indicate the emergence of a new pattern in which conflict is actively managed even within a structurally adversarial context. This suggests that the Korean Peninsula is undergoing a broader transitional phase.
This transformation implies that both the meaning of peace and the approaches to achieving it are being fundamentally reshaped. Peace is no longer a condition gradually built through improved relations or expanded cooperation. Instead, it is increasingly understood as a condition sustained through the management of conflict under adversarial circumstances.
In this respect, the current situation should not be viewed solely as a crisis, but rather as an early stage in the formation of a new equilibrium characterized by “hostile coexistence.” North Korea’s limited yet calibrated
responses can be interpreted as initial indicators of this shift. The Korean Peninsula appears to be moving toward a new form of stability defined by “managed tension within persistent hostility.”
What is critical is to avoid interpreting these changes through outdated frameworks or dismissing them as temporary phenomena. The task at hand is not to transform the relationship in the near term, but rather to develop realistic approaches for managing conflict within a fundamentally unchanged relationship.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula can no longer be understood solely as an aspirational end state. Instead, it must be approached as a continuous process of management and institutional design. The era of “adversarial coexistence” is already underway, and the manner in which peace is constructed within this framework will depend on future policy innovation and strategic adaptability. – Eungoo, Park (Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification)
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